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While partners are free to vary many aspects of their
relationship . . . they are not free to destroy its fiduciary
1
character.
† J.D. Candidate 2007, William Mitchell College of Law; Law Review Staff
Member; B.A., Marketing Management, summa cum laude, Concordia University,
St. Paul, 2004. The author expresses special appreciation to James F. Hogg and
Daniel S. Kleinberger, Professors of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, for
their input and advice.
1. Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 280 F. Supp. 2d 895, 901 (D. Minn.
2003) (quoting Appletree Square I Ltd. P’ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d
889, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)), aff’d, 404 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2005). A complete
quote from Saballus v. Timke provides an illuminating context for the phrase:
Once a partnership has been formed, certain consequences follow as to
the relations between the partners. First, the relationship of partners is
that of mutual agents . . . . Second, the relationship is one of a fiduciary
nature. Third, as to the specifics, the U.P.A. [Uniform Partnership Act]
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INTRODUCTION

On Christmas morning, the eyes of two young brothers
glistened with excitement as they unwrapped matching gifts: two
sets of boxing gloves. Within moments, they cleared the furniture
and Round 1 began. The fun ended with the first blow to the face.
“You can’t do that!” shouted the recipient of the punch. To even
things out, he sent a blow into his brother’s stomach. Competition
turned to rage, and punches were replaced by kicking and
2
screaming.
Like some partners, these boys joined their endeavor with the
understanding they could compete and need not disclose their
moves to the other. But when one party thought the other went
too far, he cried “foul,” and a referee was needed to resolve the
dispute. Many partners agree to compete and agree to limit what
they must disclose to each other. But when a fight ensues, courts
decide whether the partners properly limited their fiduciary duties.
Under partnership law, partners may limit some of the
fiduciary duties they owe to each other by drafting certain
provisions into their partnership agreement. After Triple Five of
3
Minnesota, Inc. v. Simon (Triple Five), however, partners may have
difficulty knowing whether they can effectively limit their duty to
disclose information material to the partnership and their duty not
4
to usurp a partnership opportunity.
In Triple Five, the Eighth Circuit held that a partnership
agreement provision limiting fiduciary duties would not be given
5
effect. The partnership agreement provided that “no partner shall
be liable to any other partner except in the case of fraud or gross
6
negligence.” Although the district court found no fraud or gross

provides a number of rules which apply in the absence of contrary
agreement. In sum, partners are free to vary many aspects of their
relationship inter se, but they are not free to destroy its fiduciary
character.
460 N.E.2d 755, 759–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (quoting HAROLD GILL
REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP 267 (1979)).
2. For this memory and the years of sparring that followed, the author would
like to thank his brother, Jesse D. Hall, Deputy Public Defender, Office of the
Colorado State Public Defender.
3. 404 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2005).
4. See id.
5. Id. at 1096–1100.
6. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 901. The exculpatory clause in the
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negligence, the district court and the Eighth Circuit held that
enforcing this provision would have destroyed the fiduciary
7
character of the partnership. Thus, the parties were held to a
higher fiduciary standard than they had written into their
8
partnership agreement. Despite the limitations in the partnership
agreement, the defendants owed Triple Five various common-law
9
Specifically, the defendants were found in
fiduciary duties.
violation of the duty to disclose and the duty not to usurp a
10
As a result, the defendants lost
partnership opportunity.
managing control of the largest mall in America, along with
11
millions in profits generated by the mall.
The holding in this case raises a question for all partners and
12
potentially all parties in business together: to what extent may
parties in business together limit their fiduciary duties without
13
risking that the limitations will be held unenforceable?
partnership agreement between Triple Five and the Simons provided the
following:
No Partner in this Partnership shall be liable to this Partnership, or to
any partner for any act performed, or omitted to be performed, by it in
the conduct of its duties as a Partner, if such act or omission is not
performed or made fraudulently or with gross negligence.
Brief for Appellant-Petitioner at 31, Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 404 F.3d
1088 (8th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1172).
7. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 901, aff’d, 404 F.3d at 1095–99.
8. Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1095. The court noted that “Minnesota law
imposes the highest duty of integrity and good faith on partners in their dealings
with each other.” Id. (citing Vernier v. Forbes, 223 Minn. 69, 25 N.W.2d 704, 708
(1946)). Further, “[p]ersons burdened with such duties are fiduciaries by
definition and fiduciaries may not usurp or divert for their own benefit business
opportunities that properly belong to the partnership.” Triple Five, 404 F.3d at
1095 (citing Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 219–20, 222 N.W.2d 71, 78 (1974)).
9. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
10. Id. at 901–05 (addressing the duty to disclose); Id. at 905–07 (addressing
the duty not to usurp a partnership opportunity).
11. See id. at 909–10.
12. Although the business entity limiting fiduciary duties in the Triple Five
decisions was a partnership, the final holding may not be limited to partnerships.
Other business entity forms include fiduciary duties, and attempts to limit such
duties by contract may be subject to similar restrictions. For this reason, owners of
other entity forms, such as LLCs, should ensure their fiduciary duty limitation
provisions do not exceed what their courts will enforce.
13. See Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 901; see also CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL
S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶¶ 10.06[2],
14.05[4] (1994 & Supp. 2 2006) (explaining the extent that LLC members may
limit their fiduciary duties without the risk of having the limitations held
unenforceable); DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND LLCS: EXAMPLES
AND EXPLANATIONS §§ 9.6.2, 9.9 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining the extent to which the
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This note first examines the uniform acts applicable to
partners’ fiduciary duties and partners’ ability to limit fiduciary
duties, particularly the duty to disclose information and the duty
14
not to usurp a partnership opportunity. Next is a summary of the
facts of the Triple Five decision, the procedural history of the case,
15
and the courts’ analysis of the case. In light of the Triple Five
decisions, this note examines related cases in Minnesota and other
16
jurisdictions.
This note then considers criticisms regarding
17
fiduciary duty limitations and the Triple Five decisions. The note
concludes with concerns over the ambiguous state of the law after
Triple Five, offering advice for parties seeking to draft partnership
18
agreements that limit fiduciary duties.
II. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON PARTNERS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES
A. Introduction
States have adopted, with some modifications, a number of
model laws applicable to partnerships. The Uniform Partnership
19
Act of 1914 (UPA) was the first of the uniform laws on
partnerships to be promulgated and was adopted by every state
20
except Louisiana. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA)
21
was promulgated in 1994 and amended in 1996 and 1997. Over
22
thirty jurisdictions adopted RUPA to some extent. The Uniform
23
Limited Partnership Act (ULPA-2001) was promulgated in 2001
and will likely be adopted by many states that enacted previous

Uniform Partnership Act and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act allow partners
to limit their fiduciary duties without risking that the limitations will be held
unenforceable).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914).
20. See Magan Causey, Limited Liability for General Partnerships: Another
Louisiana Anomaly?, 66 LA. L. REV. 527, 535 (2006).
21. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, Imprint Page (1997) (amended 2005).
22. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, AND THE
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (2001) xxiii (2006).
23. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (2001).
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24

versions.
Delaware, for example, utilizes these model laws in
many ways, but Delaware gives great freedom to partners to limit or
25
eliminate entirely the fiduciary duties they owe each other.
B. Duty to Disclose
1.

UPA

UPA does not allow partners to modify their duty to disclose.
UPA section 20 provides that “[p]artners shall render on demand
true and full information of all things affecting the partnership to
any partner or the legal representative of any deceased partner or
26
partner under legal disability.” UPA does not expressly authorize
27
partners to modify the fiduciary duty created by this section.
2.

RUPA

RUPA allows partners to modify their duty to disclose subject
to restrictions. RUPA provides the duty to disclose under section
28
29
403(c). Under RUPA, the duty to disclose is not a fiduciary duty.
RUPA section 403(c) provides the following:
Each partner and the partnership shall furnish to a
partner, and to the legal representative of a deceased
partner or partner under legal disability:
(1) without demand, any information concerning the
partnership’s business and affairs reasonably required
for the proper exercise of the partner’s rights and
duties under the partnership agreement or this [Act];
and
(2) on demand, any other information concerning
the partnership’s business and affairs, except to the
extent the demand or the information demanded is
24. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 22.
25. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103 (2006) (“It is the policy of this chapter
to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the
enforceability of partnership agreements.”).
26. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 20 (1914).
27. 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 6.06(e), at 6:107 (Supp. 2005).
28. Id.; see also REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 403(c) (1997) (amended 2005).
29. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(a) (“The only fiduciary duties a
partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and
the duty of care . . . .”).
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unreasonable or otherwise improper under the
30
circumstances.
In its list of nonwaivable provisions, RUPA section 103 does
31
Thus, RUPA suggests that
not include the duty to disclose.
partners may waive the duty to disclose, with the exception that
limitations on “the right of access to books and records” must be
32
33
reasonable. The definition of reasonable was left for the courts.
The waiver of such duties will be interpreted strictly and must not
34
be used to protect wrongdoers from liability. Some courts have
implied that the duty to disclose cannot be waived, but the
relevancy of these cases to this issue is questionable because of the
35
unusual facts and law involved in the cases.

30. Id. § 403(c). RUPA’s Comments provide additional insight into section
403(c):
Subsection (b)(2) provides that the partnership agreement may not
unreasonably restrict a partner or former partner’s access rights to books
and records under Section 403(b). It is left to the courts to determine
what restrictions are reasonable. See Comment 2 to Section 403. Other
information rights in Section 403 can be varied or even eliminated by
agreement.
Id. § 103 cmt. 3. RUPA’s Comments elaborate further in section 403:
Under Section 103(b)(2), a partner’s right of access to partnership books
and records may not be unreasonably restricted by the partnership
agreement. Thus, to preserve a partner’s core information rights despite
unequal bargaining power, an agreement limiting a partner’s right to
inspect and copy partnership books and records is subject to judicial
review. Nevertheless, reasonable restrictions on access to partnership
books and records by agreement are authorized. For example, a
provision in a partnership agreement denying partners access to the
compensation of other partners should be upheld, absent any abuse such
as fraud or duress.
Id. § 403 cmt. 2.
31. See id. § 103; see also 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.06(e), at
6:107–08 (Supp. 2005).
32. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b)(2) (restricting partners only from
“unreasonably restrict[ing] the right of access to books and records”); see also 2
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.06(e), at 6:107–08 (Supp. 2005).
33. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 103 cmt. 3, 403 cmt. 2.
34. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.06(e), at 6:107–08 (Supp.
2005) (citing Appletree Square I Ltd. P’ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).
35. Id. at 6:108 (discussing and dismissing such cases because they do not
clearly stand for the proposition that the duty to disclose cannot be waived).
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RULPA

Like RUPA, ULPA-2001 allows partners to modify their duty
to disclose subject to restrictions. ULPA-2001 section 407(b)
provides the following duty of general partners to disclose:
Each general partner and the limited partnership shall
furnish to a general partner:
(1) without demand, any information concerning the
limited partnership’s activities and activities
reasonably required for the proper exercise of the
general partner’s rights and duties under the
partnership agreement or this [Act]; and
(2) on demand, any other information concerning
the limited partnership’s activities, except to the
extent the demand or the information demanded is
unreasonable or otherwise improper under the
36
circumstances.
37
Section 304 prescribes the duty of disclosure to limited partners.
Waiver of the duty to disclose is restricted in ULPA-2001 section
110(b)(4):
A partnership agreement may not: . . . unreasonably
restrict the right to information under Sections 304 or
407, but the partnership agreement may impose
reasonable restrictions on the availability and use of
information obtained under those sections and may
define appropriate remedies, including liquidated
damages, for a breach of any reasonable restriction on
38
use.

36. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 407(b) (2001).
37. See id. § 304.
38. Id. § 110(b)(4). It is worth noting that a major exception to section
110(b)(4) is provided in sections 304(g) and 407(f). Section 304(g) allows those
controlling the partnership (usually the general partner) to exercise some
discretion regarding the information it will release to the limited partners: “The
limited partnership may impose reasonable restrictions on the use of information
obtained under this section. In a dispute concerning the reasonableness of a
restriction under this subsection, the limited partnership has the burden of
proving reasonableness.” Id. § 304(g). A similar provision is provided in section
407(f), which allows those controlling the partnership to exercise some discretion
regarding the information released to general partners. See id. § 407(f). Thus,
sections 304(g) and 407(f) may have the effect of limiting the information that the
general partner, who is managing the partnership, must disclose to the other
partners.
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Thus, partners may waive the duty to disclose in the partnership
agreement only if the waiver is reasonable.
C. Usurpation of a Partnership Opportunity
1.

UPA & RUPA: The Duty Generally

Under UPA and RUPA, the duty to account for a partnership
opportunity correlates with two similar duties found in the
40
39
First, use of property owned by the partnership is
statutes.
limited to partnership purposes, which excludes personal use by
41
the partners. Second, partners may not be compensated for the
42
partnership’s work unless they agree otherwise. Consistent with
these provisions, UPA and RUPA require that partners hold as
trustee for the partnership any benefit derived from the
43
partnership property or business. RUPA adds that “[a] partner
39. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(c), at 6:129 (Supp. 2006).
40. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 204; UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 8 (1914) (describing
partnership property).
41. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 25(2)(a) (“A partner, subject to the provisions of
this Act and to any agreement between the partners, has an equal right with his
partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes; but he
has no right to possess such property for any other purpose without the consent of
his partners.”); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(g) (“A partner may use or possess
partnership property only on behalf of the partnership.”).
42. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(f) (“No partner is entitled to remuneration for
acting in the partnership business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to
reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs.”);
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(h) (“A partner is not entitled to remuneration for
services performed for the partnership, except for reasonable compensation for
services rendered in winding up the business of the partnership.”).
43. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 21(1) (“Every partner must account to the partnership
for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the
consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation,
conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its
property.”); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(b)(1) (“A partner’s duty of loyalty to
the partnership and the other partners is limited to the following: (1) to account
to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit derived
by the partner in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or
derived from a use by the partner of partnership property, including the
appropriation of a partnership opportunity.”). The comments to RUPA section
404(b) explain the following:
Section 404(b) provides three specific rules that comprise a partner’s
duty of loyalty. Those rules are exclusive and encompass the entire duty
of loyalty. Subsection (b)(l) is based on UPA Section 21(1) and
continues the rule that partnership property usurped by a partner,
including the misappropriation of a partnership opportunity, is held in
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does not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the
partnership agreement merely because the partner’s conduct
44
furthers the partner’s own interest.”
2.

UPA & RUPA: Purpose for the Duty

One purpose for the duty to account for a partnership
opportunity is to prevent partners from misusing partnership assets
45
and information for personal gain. A second purpose is to direct
partners to use their energies to further the partnership rather
46
than for personal gain.
3.

UPA & RUPA: Limiting the Duty

Under UPA and RUPA, partners may draft their partnership
47
agreement to limit the scope of partnership opportunities. For
example, a partnership opportunity can be sharply limited to
developing one property, leaving an adjacent property available for
48
This limitation would be
a partner to pursue individually.
effective because the partnership involved only the first property,
and the partners were aware at the outset that each could engage
trust for the partnership. The express reference to the appropriation of
a partnership opportunity is new, but merely codifies case law on the
point. Under a constructive trust theory, the partnership can recover any
money or property in the partner’s hands that can be traced to the
partnership. As a result, the partnership’s claim is greater than that of an
ordinary creditor. See Official Comment to UPA Section 21.
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(b) cmt. 2 (citations omitted).
44. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(e). RUPA explains the section:
Subsection (e) is new and deals expressly with a very basic issue on which
the UPA is silent. A partner as such is not a trustee and is not held to the
same standards as a trustee. Subsection (e) makes clear that a partner’s
conduct is not deemed to be improper merely because it serves the
partner’s own individual interest.
That admonition has particular application to the duty of loyalty and
the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. It underscores the
partner’s rights as an owner and principal in the enterprise, which must
always be balanced against his duties and obligations as an agent and
fiduciary. For example, a partner who, with consent, owns a shopping
center may, under subsection (e), legitimately vote against a proposal by
the partnership to open a competing shopping center.
Id. cmt. 5.
45. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(d), at 6:130.3 (Supp. 2006).
46. Id. at 6:130.3–.4.
47. Id. at 6:133–35 (Supp. 2007).
48. Id. at 6:135 (citing e.g. Lipinski v. Lipinski, 227 Minn. 511, 35 N.W.2d 708
(1949); Mathis v. Meyers, 574 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1978)).
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49

in outside activities. Moreover, partners may consent to specific
transactions that would otherwise be deemed “partnership
50
opportunities.”
RUPA section 103(b) provides the limits to modifying the duty
of loyalty:
The partnership agreement may not:
eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b) or
603(b)(3), but: (i) the partnership agreement may
identify specific types or categories of activities that
do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly
unreasonable; or (ii) all of the partners or a number
or percentage specified in the partnership agreement
may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all
material facts, a specific act or transaction that
51
otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.
49. Id.
50. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07, at 6:151–52 (Supp. 2006)
(citing UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 21; REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3)(ii)).
51. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b). The RUPA authors note this section
is:
intended to ensure a fundamental core of fiduciary responsibility.
Neither the fiduciary duties of loyalty or care, nor the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing, may be eliminated entirely. However, the statutory
requirements of each can be modified by agreement, subject to the
limitation stated in subsection (b)(3) through (5).
There has always been a tension regarding the extent to which a
partner’s fiduciary duty of loyalty can be varied by agreement, as
contrasted with the other partners’ consent to a particular and known
breach of duty. On the one hand, courts have been loathe to enforce
agreements broadly “waiving” in advance a partner’s fiduciary duty of
loyalty, especially where there is unequal bargaining power, information,
or sophistication. For this reason, a very broad provision in a partnership
agreement in effect negating any duty of loyalty, such as a provision
giving a managing partner complete discretion to manage the business
with no liability except for acts and omissions that constitute willful
misconduct, will not likely be enforced. See, e.g., Labovitz v. Dolan, 545
N.E.2d 304 (Ill. 1989). On the other hand, it is clear that the remaining
partners can “consent” to a particular conflicting interest transaction or
other breach of duty, after the fact, provided there is full disclosure.
RUPA attempts to provide a standard that partners can rely upon in
drafting exculpatory agreements. It is not necessary that the agreement
be restricted to a particular transaction. That would require bargaining
over every transaction or opportunity, which would be excessively
burdensome. The agreement may be drafted in terms of types or
categories of activities or transactions, but it should be reasonably
specific.
A provision in a real estate partnership agreement authorizing a
partner who is a real estate agent to retain commissions on partnership
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Thus, RUPA allows partners to agree that the scope of the
partnership excludes specific types of activities, allowing partners to
take personal advantage of those opportunities, as long as these
52
agreements are “reasonable.”
4.

ULPA Duty & Waiver

Limited partners have no fiduciary duties to any other partner
53
under ULPA-2001 section 305. General partners have a duty of
54
loyalty under ULPA-2001 section 408(b), which was copied from,
55
and is substantially the same as, RUPA section 404.
Likewise,
property bought and sold by that partner would be an example of a “type
or category” of activity that is not manifestly unreasonable and thus
should be enforceable under the Act. Likewise, a provision authorizing
that partner to buy or sell real property for his own account without prior
disclosure to the other partners or without first offering it to the
partnership would be enforceable as a valid category of partnership
activity.
Ultimately, the courts must decide the outer limits of validity of such
agreements, and context may be significant. It is intended that the risk
of judicial refusal to enforce manifestly unreasonable exculpatory clauses
will discourage sharp practices while accommodating the legitimate
needs of the parties in structuring their relationship.
Id. § 103 cmt. 4.
52. See id. § 103(b).
53. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 305 (2001). This section provides the
following:
(a) A limited partner does not have any fiduciary duty to the limited
partnership or to any other partner solely by reason of being a limited
partner.
(b) A limited partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and
the other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement
and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing.
(c) A limited partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this
[Act] or under the partnership agreement merely because the limited
partner’s conduct furthers the limited partner’s own interest.
Id.
54. Id. § 305(b) cmt. subsec. (b).
55. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408. RULPA section 408(b) provides
the following:
A general partner’s duty of loyalty to the limited partnership and the
other partners is limited to the following:
(1) to account to the limited partnership and hold as trustee for it
any property, profit, or benefit derived by the general partner in the
conduct and winding up of the limited partnership’s activities or
derived from a use by the general partner of limited partnership
property, including the appropriation of a limited partnership
opportunity;
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ULPA-2001 section 110(b) essentially copies RUPA section 103(b)
by prohibiting the elimination of the duty of loyalty but allowing
partners to “identify specific types or categories of activities that do
not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable,” and
to establish a procedure for partners to ratify a violation of the duty
56
of loyalty.
D. Delaware’s Contractarian Freedom
Delaware’s partnership statute is based on RUPA, with one
57
The statute provides that fiduciary duty
significant exception.
waivers are enforceable: “A partnership agreement may provide for
the limitation or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of
contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a
58
partner . . . .” The statute expressly explains that “the policy of
this chapter [is] to give maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership
59
agreements.”
(2) to refrain from dealing with the limited partnership in the
conduct or winding up of the limited partnership’s activities as or on
behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the limited
partnership; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the limited partnership in the
conduct or winding up of the limited partnership’s activities.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408(b). See also REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404.
56. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 110(b). This section provides the
following:
A partnership agreement may not: . . . (5) eliminate the duty of loyalty
under Section 408, but the partnership agreement may:
(A) identify specific types or categories of activities that do not
violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; and
(B) specify the number or percentage of partners which may
authorize or ratify, after full disclosure to all partners of all material
facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the
duty of loyalty.
Id. See also REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b).
57. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(h), at 6:162 (Supp. 2006).
58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(f) (2006). See also 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN,
supra note 27, § 6.07(h), at 6:162–63 (Supp. 2005 & Supp. 2006) (discussing this
statute).
59. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(c). A longer quote from the statute may
be helpful in understanding the operation of Delaware’s fiduciary duty waivers,
which includes a requirement of “good faith and fair dealing” to prevent the use
of waivers for malicious purposes:
(c) It is the policy of this chapter to give maximum effect to the principle
of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership
agreements.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2007], Art. 8
7. HALL - RC.DOC

1496

4/22/2007 5:43:51 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:4

Delaware’s limited partnership statute includes a similar
60
As a result, Delaware’s statutes provide the most
provision.
deference to partners seeking to reduce the fiduciary duties owed
61
between partners.
III. THE TRIPLE FIVE V. SIMON CASE
A. Facts
1.

Developing the Mall of America

The story of the Triple Five decisions begins with an idea to
build the largest shopping mall in the United States—the Mall of
62
America. The idea originated with four brothers: Raphael, Nader,
63
Bahman, and Eskander Ghermezian. The brothers own Plaintiff
64
Triple Five of Minnesota, Inc. (Triple Five). Previously, Triple
Five developed the “largest indoor retail and entertainment
(d) A partner or other person shall not be liable to a partnership or to
another partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise
bound by a partnership agreement for breach of fiduciary duty for the
partner's or other person's good faith reliance on the provisions of the
partnership agreement.
(e) Unless otherwise provided in a partnership agreement, a partner or
other person shall not be liable to a limited partnership or to another
partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a
partnership agreement for breach of fiduciary duty for the partner's or
other person's good faith reliance on the provisions of the partnership
agreement.
(f) A partnership agreement may provide for the limitation or
elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of
duties (including fiduciary duties) of a partner or other person to a
partnership or to another partner or to another person that is a party to
or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement; provided, that a
partnership agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or
omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of the implied contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Id. § 15-103(c)–(f).
60. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(h), at 6:163 (Supp. 2005)
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101 (2005)).
61. See, e.g., Daniel S. Kleinberger, Careful What You Wish For—Freedom of
Contract and the Necessity of Careful Scrivening, 24 PUBOGRAM 19–23 (2006)
(discussing the dangers of Delaware’s “freedom of contract” regime).
62. Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 280 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (D. Minn.
2003).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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complex in the world:” the West Edmonton Mall in Edmonton,
65
Alberta, Canada. In 1986, Triple Five owned the right to develop
66
the land upon which the Mall of America was later built. To
67
develop the Mall of America, Triple Five sought business partners.
In 1987, the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association
68
(Teachers) brought substantial financing to the project in
69
70
exchange for very favorable terms and a buy-sell right. At the
same time, two brothers, the defendants Melvin and Herbert
71
The Simon brothers
Simon, became involved in the project.
owned a number of real estate businesses, which were also named
72
as defendants. The Simons also had a prominent and influential

65. Id.
66. Id. at 898.
67. Id.
68. Id. Teachers eventually paid $650 million in construction financing. Id.
69. See id. These favorable terms lowered the Teachers’ risk and made
ownership of Teachers’ interest more valuable than the percentages owned by
Triple Five or Simon:
Although the ownership of the Mall was split almost evenly between
Teachers and [Mall of America Associates (MOAA), a partnership of
which the Simon brothers and Triple Five each owned half], Teachers
received all, or substantially all, of the profits from the Mall. According
to the parties' various agreements, because Teachers had supplied the
equity for constructing the Mall, Teachers had a preference in any profits
generated by the Mall. This preference took the form of a $683 million
capital account. Teachers was guaranteed an eight-and-one-half percent
annual return on this capital account, or approximately $58 million per
year. Any income over and above the first $58 million would be split
again among the parties, with Teachers once again having a preference
for a percentage of this income. It is not disputed that the Mall has never
generated $58 million in annual income and that, as a result, Teachers
has always received the entire income generated by the Mall.
Teachers’ capital account also guaranteed that Teachers would be
paid back for the money it put into the Mall if the Mall were ever sold or
otherwise financed. For example, if the Mall were sold for $700 million,
Teachers would be entitled to $683 million, with the remaining $17
million divided among the partners. If the Mall were sold for less than
$683 million, Teachers would receive the entire purchase price and
MOAA would receive nothing.
Id. at 898–99.
70. Id. at 898. Similar to the favorable financial terms that attached to the
partnership interest owned by Teachers, Teachers also had a strategic advantage.
Id. at 899. Teachers had the right, subject to some restrictions, to name a price for
its ownership interest, forcing the other owners to either buy Teachers’ entire
interest at that price or sell their own interest at that price. Id.
71. Id. at 898.
72. Id.
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73

role within the Simon Property Group, Inc. (SPG), a publicly
74
traded real estate investment trust, which was also a defendant.
The ownership of the mall involved a complex structure of
75
Teachers
business entities that can be summarized as follows.
76
owned fifty-five percent in the Mall of America LP (MOAC LP).
The remaining forty-five percent interest in MOAC LP was owned
by the Mall of America Associates (MOAA), a partnership of which
77
the Simon brothers and Triple Five each owned half. An entity
owned by the Simon brothers was the managing general partner
78
for MOAA.
2.

Fiduciary Duty Limitation

The MOAA partnership agreement between the Simon
brothers and Triple Five included a general limitation on fiduciary
73. Id. The Simons’ prominent role within SPG is illustrated by a number of
facts. The Simons’ family members, and companies controlled by them, own over
twenty-one percent of SPG shares. Id. The Simon brothers are co-chairmen of
SPG and hold the same title in all their other businesses involved in this litigation.
Id. Melvin Simon’s son, defendant David Simon, is the CEO or executive vice
president of all these businesses, including SPG. Id. Randall Foxworthy, also a
defendant, is the executive vice president for corporate development for all of
these businesses, including SPG. Id. Finally, the district court noted that the
“[d]efendants did not differentiate among the various closely held Simon family
entities,” so the court allowed those entities to be liable despite the entities’
limited liability veils. Id. at 901.
74. Id. at 898.
75. Id. This is the complex ownership structure: Teachers converted its $650
million in construction financing into an equity investment in the Mall after
construction was completed. Id.
In return for its investment, Teachers received an equity interest in Mall
of America Company LP (“MOAC LP”), which is the managing partner
and owner of 99% of Mall of America Company (“MOAC”). MOAC is
the company that owns the Mall. MOAC LP is a partnership between
Teachers, which owns 55% of MOAC LP, and Mall of America Associates
(“MOAA”), which owns 45%. MOAA is a 50/50 partnership between SiMinn Developers Limited Partnership (“Si-Minn LP”) and Triple Five.
Si-Minn LP is the managing partner of MOAA. Si-Minn LP is comprised
of a general partner, Si-Minn, Inc., and limited partners in the form of
members of the Simon family, including Defendants Melvin and Herbert
Simon. Si-Minn, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Melvin Simon &
Associates, Inc. These same parties owned similar percentage interests in
the entertainment portion of the Mall, called Minntertainment
Associates (“Minntertainment”).
Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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duties. It provided “that no partner shall be liable to any other
79
partner except in the case of fraud or gross negligence.” This
lawsuit arose out of circumstances surrounding Teachers’ sale of
80
half of its ownership interest to SPG.
3.

Selling Part-Ownership in the Mall of America

In March 1998, Teachers wrote in a letter to MOAA that
Teachers would consider selling all or part of its interest in the Mall
81
of America. Herbert Simon responded in a letter to Teachers,
82
which was blind copied to Triple Five. In a forceful tone, the
letter warned Teachers that the interests of the Simon brothers and
Triple Five should be considered in such a sale; otherwise they
83
would seek to enforce their rights to prevent a sale. According to
Triple Five, this letter lulled them into thinking the Simon brothers
were protecting their interests and were not seeking to buy
84
Teachers’ interest. But at the same time, the Simon brothers were
85
preparing to buy Teachers’ interest through their SPG entity. For
the rest of the year, the Simon brothers kept Triple Five in the dark
86
while preparing to buy Teachers’ interest.
87
In January 1999, SPG met with Teachers. After three months
of negotiations with Teachers, Herbert Simon sent a letter to
inform Triple Five that they were planning to purchase fifty
percent of Teachers’ interest in the Mall of America through their
88
SPG entity. The financing and terms were prepared so the deal
could be finalized before Triple Five could obtain financing to
89
Moreover, the Simons did not invite
participate in the deal.
90
Triple Five to participate.
Based on these acts, Triple Five

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 901.
See id. at 898.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 902–03.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 903.
Id.
Id.
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asserted that the Simon brothers had usurped a partnership
91
opportunity.
Triple Five repeatedly requested information regarding the
92
transaction from the Simon brothers. The defendants refused
them the information and even denied having some of the
93
Triple Five asserted that the Simon
requested information.
brothers violated the fiduciary duty of disclosure for failing to
94
disclose information regarding the purchase.
B. The Triple Five v. Simon Trial Court Decision
In the Triple Five decisions, the district court and the Eighth
95
Circuit considered a number of issues. For purposes of this article
however, the discussion is focused primarily on the waiver of
96
fiduciary duties.
1.

Introduction

Triple Five, the plaintiff, filed suit in federal district court
against the defendants, brothers Melvin and Herbert Simon, their
closely held businesses, and other parties in business with the
97
Simons.
The general question was whether the defendants
98
violated fiduciary duties to Triple Five. This question raised three
99
main issues. First, the court had to determine which parties owed
fiduciary duties, which included determining whether the
100
exculpatory clause limited the partners’ fiduciary duties. Second,
the court evaluated whether the defendants breached their
101
Third, the court sought to identify the proper
fiduciary duties.
102
remedies.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 905.
Id. at 903–04.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 897–909.
See infra Part III.B.1–5.
Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 897–98.
Id. at 899–900.
Id. at 900–07.
Id. at 901–02.
Id. at 902–07.
Id. at 908–10.
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Fiduciary Duties

In determining which parties owed a fiduciary duty, the court
103
The court stated that
considered a number of legal principles.
fiduciary duties may be imputed to officers and directors of a
104
general partner, including corporate general partners.
Moreover, standards of conduct for managing partners apply both
to managing partners, such as the Simons, and to those persons or
entities holding themselves out as having authority or as having the
right to take action for the partnership (as the Simons did in
holding themselves out as having the authority to act for Triple
105
Five). Finally, the court noted that a partnership is liable for the
106
wrongful acts or omissions of a partner.
Based on this, the
district court held that the defendants named in Count I owed
107
fiduciary duties to Triple Five.
Count I notably excluded SPG, the publicly traded
corporation in which the Simon family had a minority interest and
108
management involvement. The court, however, declared that the
109
defendants cannot hide behind corporate formalities. The court
stated that the defendants did not differentiate among their various
closely held Simon family entities, and the court would not do so
110
either.
Thus, the veil limiting liability between the Simons and
their entities was pierced, and fiduciary duties were imposed on
111
all. The Eighth Circuit affirmed by expressly holding that “all of
the Simon Defendants, including SPG, [had] a fiduciary
112
responsibility to Triple Five.”
103. In short, the court considered fiduciary duties, apparent authority,
principal liability, partnership liability, and piercing the corporate veil. See id. at
901–07.
104. Id. at 901.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 323A.3-05; Sage Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 480
N.W.2d 695, 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 900; see also id. at 898 (explaining the Simons’ extensive involvement
in SPG). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit further explained the holding that SPG
owed Triple Five fiduciary duties. Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 404 F.3d
1088, 1096 (8th Cir. 2005).
109. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1096. While it is common for a corporation in a
partnership to owe fiduciary duties like any other partner, what is noteworthy here
is that SPG was not a partner with Triple Five, and yet the Simons’ fiduciary duties
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Exculpatory Clause
113

Next, the court considered whether the defendants
breached their fiduciary duties by their various acts and omissions
involving the purchase of an ownership interest in the Mall of
114
America.
The defendants pointed to a clause in the partnership
agreement providing that “no partner shall be liable to any other
115
The
partner except in the case of fraud or gross negligence.”
court found that the conduct alleged did not constitute “fraud or
116
gross negligence.” Still, the court noted that although parties are
free to vary many aspects of their relationship, they are not free to
117
Accordingly, the court held that
destroy its fiduciary character.
despite the partners’ agreement, the defendants owed Triple Five
various common law fiduciary duties for which they could be
118
liable.

to Triple Five were imposed on SPG. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, §
6.07(a), at 6:122–24 (Supp. 2006) (citing Spitzer v. Shanley Corp., 870 F. Supp.
565, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding under Oklahoma law that a corporate general
partner has a fiduciary duty to other partners); Bankard v. First Carolina Comm.,
No. 89 C 8571, 1991 WL 268652 at *10–12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1991) (holding under
North Carolina law that a majority owner corporation along with its directors,
officers, and managers, had fiduciary duties to the corporation’s limited partners);
James River-Pennington Inc. v. CRSS Capital, Inc., Civ. A. No. 13870, 1995 WL
106554 at *10–12 (Del. Ch. March 6, 1995) (holding under Delaware law that
directors of a corporate general partner owed duties to its limited partner);
Crenshaw v. Swenson, 611 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Tex. App. 1980) (holding under
Texas law that a general partner and the corporation it owned had breached the
fiduciary duty the general partner owed to its limited partner when the general
partner placed proceeds from a sale of partnership property into the corporation's
bank account).
113. Once the district court established that the Simons and their entities
named as defendants shared common obligations of fiduciary duties to Triple
Five, the court referred to all Simon defendants as “defendants” rather than listing
each. For consistency and brevity, the term “defendants” is used here in the same
way.
114. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 901–06.
115. Id. at 901.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Breach of Fiduciary Duties

The court analyzed three aspects of common-law fiduciary
119

duties: (1) the duty to disclose negotiations, (2) usurpation of
121
120
partnership opportunity, and (3) conduct between partners.
a.

The Duty to Disclose

The court noted that the duty to disclose involves “‘a duty to
render [un]to any partner on demand true and full information as
to all things affecting the partnership.’ Partners may not alter this
duty by contract. Moreover, a partner has a ‘broad common-law
duty to disclose all material facts,’ whether requested to do so or
122
not.” Here, the court found that the defendants concealed their
negotiations from Triple Five, misled Triple Five into believing they
were protecting their interest, and refused to disclose material
details about the transaction, which are required in a timely
123
manner. As fiduciaries, the defendants were obligated to provide
Triple Five with all material information, regardless of whether
124
The failure to provide information
Triple Five requested it.
constituted a breach of the defendants’ duty to disclose and
harmed Triple Five by preventing Triple Five from participating in
125
the transaction.
b.

Usurpation of Partnership Opportunity

The court considered whether the defendants usurped a
partnership opportunity in breach of their fiduciary duties when
they purchased the additional ownership interest in the Mall of
America, including placing their personal interest above that of the
126
partnership.
The court found that the offer to buy the interest
was a partnership opportunity because Triple Five could afford the
purchase, the seller, Teachers, never refused to deal with Triple
Five, and the opportunity had a logical relationship to the
119. Id. at 902–05.
120. Id. at 905–07.
121. Id. at 907.
122. Id. at 901–02 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 902–05.
124. Id. at 904 (citing Appletree Square I Ltd. P’ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494
N.W.2d 889, 892 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).
125. Id. at 904–05.
126. Id. at 905–07.
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127

partnership’s interests.
The fact that SPG, a publicly traded
corporation, was purchasing the interest in the mall did not deter
128
the court from imposing the defendants’ fiduciary duties on SPG.
Thus, the defendants’ usurpation of this partnership opportunity
was a breach of their fiduciary duties, principally the duty of
129
loyalty.
The court also held that SPG’s act of taking a transaction fee
was wrongful and that the defendants’ failure to disclose this fee
130
was a breach of their fiduciary duty.
In a related matter, the court found insufficient evidence to
support Triple Five’s claim that the defendants breached their
fiduciary duties by failing to distribute proceeds from an alleged
131
$25 million capital account to Triple Five.

127. Id. at 905–06.
128. Id. at 906. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained why SPG, a
publicly traded corporation, was liable despite the fact that the Simon family held
only a minority interest in SPG’s stocks:
We are not unmindful of the difficulties faced by business people who
are principals in related corporate entities. Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897,
901 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting that courts must consider that individuals
often serve on several boards and are subject to competing fiduciary
duties). However, we agree with the district court that this case presents
the worst kind of self-dealing and subterfuge. Although SPG is publicly
traded, the connections between it and Si-Minn [(one of many closely
held Simon entities named as Defendants)] are far too close for comfort.
Even though SPG is a public company with an independent board of
directors, its day-to-day decisions were being made by the same people
who were decision-makers at Si-Minn. SPG officials used information
gained in their capacities as Si-Minn directors (and MOAA operatives) to
profit individually through SPG participation in this transaction. And, in
the process they shirked their individual and partnership duties to Triple
Five. Indeed, if SPG/Si-Minn had not used subterfuge to their
substantial advantage, the deal with TIAA would not have been fully
negotiated before it was communicated to Triple Five. Accordingly, we
find that both Si-Minn and SPG owe a duty of integrity and good faith to
Triple Five in this particular transaction. Because all of the Simon
defendants, including SPG, have a fiduciary responsibility to Triple Five,
we move on to examine the district court's findings that they breached
these responsibilities.
Triple Five of Minn. Inc. v. Simon, 404 F.3d 1088, 1196 (8th Cir. 2005).
129. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 906.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 906–07.
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Conduct Between Parties

The court briefly considered whether the parties’ behavior,
“behavior one might expect to see on a playground,” was consistent
132
with the very high duties the law imposes on partners. The court
133
held that the defendants’ “nefarious” behavior failed to rise to
the high standard required by law, but the court added a caveat
134
that Triple Five’s behavior was not blameless.
5.

Remedies

In response to the defendants’ breach of fiduciary duties, the
court imposed a constructive trust on the purchased interest in the
Mall of America, restored Triple Five’s opportunity to buy its share
of the interest that SPG purchased from Teachers, ordered the
Simons to disgorge Triple Five’s share of profits received from the
135
136
Mall of America,
and imposed other remedies.
Most
interestingly, the court amended the partnership agreements,
changing the managing general partner from the defendants to
Triple Five, which would take effect upon Triple Five’s payment for
137
its share of the stocks that Teachers had sold to the Simons.
C. The Triple Five v. Simon Eighth Circuit Decision
138

The Eighth Circuit largely affirmed the district court.
The
court held that SPG owed Triple Five fiduciary duties, stating that
132. Id. at 907.
133. This term is copied directly from the district court’s subsequent order.
Triple Five of Minn. Inc. v. Simon, No. 99-1894 (PAM/RLE), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 39841, at *31 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2005); see infra note 238 (discussing the
Simons’ “nefarious conduct”).
134. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 907.
135. The district court clarified in a later order that Triple Five had the
opportunity to purchase the shares, but the disgorgement of profits was
contingent upon Triple Five paying its share to purchase the shares. Triple Five of
Minn. Inc. v. Simon, No. 99-1984 (PAM/RLE), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22737, at *2
(D. Minn. Dec. 12, 2003). This is reasonable because Triple Five should not
receive profits from a partnership opportunity unless it, as a partner, contributes
towards the purchase price in the same amount that it would have had the
partnership made the purchase.
136. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 908–09.
137. Id. at 909 (holding that the partnership agreement would be modified to
make Triple Five the managing partner); Triple Five, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22737,
at *2 (clarifying that Triple Five would be the managing partner only if Triple Five
paid for its share of the stock purchase).
138. Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 404 F.3d 1088, 1096–1100 (8th Cir.
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SPG and the Simons were “too close for comfort.”
The court
140
affirmed that the defendants usurped a partnership opportunity
141
and violated the duty to disclose.
As for the provision in the partnership agreement limiting the
partners’ liability to each other in the absence of fraud or gross
negligence, the court affirmed in one sentence that this would not
limit fiduciary duties: “Finally, we agree with the district court’s
conclusion that Minnesota partnership law prevents partners from
142
contracting away their fiduciary obligations.”
The court also affirmed the decision to remove the
partnership’s managing partner, replacing the Simons with Triple
143
The court reasoned that the Simons “did not conduct
Five.
144
[themselves] in a manner befitting a managing partner.” Finally,
the court reversed and remanded the calculation of remedies by
requiring the Simons to pay half the Mall of America profits in
question to Triple Five, noting that the district court had allocated
145
too much to Triple Five.
IV. COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
LIMITATIONS & WAIVERS
A. Introduction
Courts have a variety of approaches when interpreting
partnership agreements that limit or waive fiduciary duties that
146
Relevant to the Triple Five decisions
partners owe to each other.
2005).
139. Id. The court explained that “[e]ven though SPG is a public company
with an independent board of directors, its day-to-day decisions were being made
by the same people who were decision-makers at” the Simons’ businesses. Id.; see
also supra note 73 (explaining the Simons’ extensive involvement in SPG); supra
note 128 (quoting the Eighth Circuit’s explanation for holding that SPG owed
Triple Five fiduciary duties).
140. Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1096–97.
141. Id. at 1097.
142. Id. at 1097 (citing Appletree Square I Ltd. P'ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494
N.W.2d 889, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).
143. Id. at 1100.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1099–1100.
146. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(h), at 6:151–64
(discussing the interpretation of fiduciary duty waivers) (Supp. 2005 & Supp.
2006).
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are cases involving usurpation of a partnership interest or a
violation of the duty to disclose information material to the
partnership.
Before reviewing the cases, a few observations are worth
noting. First, before a court considers whether a partnership
agreement limiting the right to disclosure or partnership
opportunities should be given effect, the court will consider
whether an opportunity actually belonged to the partnership. This
is a threshold question because it determines what is within the
scope of the partnership’s business.
If information or
opportunities do not relate to the partnership, a partner has no
duty to present them to his partners.
Second, partners often disagree regarding the scope of their
business, so it is no surprise that parties have difficulty predicting
how a court will define the scope of the partnership. This is an
especially important point for attorneys drafting partnership
agreements and assisting partnerships as the scope of the business
is defined over time.
Third, courts appear more comfortable limiting fiduciary
147
duties based on the scope of a partnership’s business than
limiting fiduciary duties based on a partnership agreement that
148
While this is an important
seeks to opt out of fiduciary duties.
lesson for partners seeking prospectively to have their fiduciary
duty limitations enforced, it is difficult in practice. That is, in
practice, a partner or attorney will have difficulty defining the
scope of a partnership prospectively because the scope of a
partnership evolves as the business progresses.
The following cases demonstrate courts’ diverse treatment of
partners’ attempts to limit their duty to disclose and allow
147. See, e.g., Appletree Square I Ltd. P'ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d
889, 893, 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (willing to limit fiduciary duties based on the
scope of a partnership’s business).
A determination of the scope of a
partnership’s business necessarily has the effect of limiting fiduciary duties
because information or opportunities outside the scope of the partnership need
not be disclosed to partners.
148. See, e.g., Lipinski v. Lipinski, 227 Minn. 511, 519–20, 35 N.W.2d 708, 713
(1949) (unwilling to limit fiduciary duties based on a partnership agreement that
seeks to opt out of fiduciary duties); Triple Five, 404 F.3d 1088 (same). One reason
courts may be more comfortable limiting fiduciary duties based on the scope of a
partnership’s business is because this determination is a finding of fact, which is
less susceptible to being overturned by an appellate court. By contrast, a holding
regarding whether a fiduciary duty limitation clause should be given effect under
law is a matter of law reviewed de novo by an appellate court.
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usurpation of partnership opportunities. The first Minnesota case
represents the notion that the scope of a partnership may be so
limited that the acquisition of an asset leased by the partnership is
not usurpation of a partnership opportunity, nor does it violate a
149
duty to disclose. The second Minnesota case firmly stands for the
proposition that partners may not agree to limit their duty to
150
Similarly,
disclose to merely the duty to disclose upon demand.
the First Circuit case stands for the notion that a partnership
agreement allowing partners to compete will be given no effect if a
partner fails to disclose an opportunity that relates to the heart of
151
the partnership’s business.
These cases are contrasted by three other cases. The Fifth
Circuit case stands for the notion that sophisticated partners may
waive their duty to disclose and may directly compete with each
152
other. Similarly, the two subsequent cases stand for the principle
that parties may waive their fiduciary duties in their partnership
agreement to such an extent that courts will treat the partners as
153
though they are not partners.
B. Minnesota Cases
1.

Lipinski v. Lipinski

In a 1949 case, the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed a
partner to secretly buy land used by his partnership, without a
disclosure to his partners, and then lease the land back to his
154
partnership.
In this case, the parties formed a partnership, subject to
Minnesota’s version of the UPA, to engage in commercial fishing
155
Next to this property was a
on leased property next to a lake.
149. Lipinski, 227 Minn. 511, 35 N.W.2d 708.
150. Appletree Square, 494 N.W.2d 889.
151. Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991).
152. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294 (5th Cir. 1993).
153. Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981); Sonet v. Timber Co.,
722 A.2d 319 (Del. Ch. 1998).
154. Lipinski, 227 Minn. at 519–20, 35 N.W.2d at 713. Contra Ditis v. Ahlvin
Const. Co., 97 N.E.2d 244, 250 (Ill. 1951) (“The fiduciary relationship between
coadventurers ordinarily precludes one of them from purchasing or leasing
property relating to the enterprise, either for himself or another, in the absence of
full disclosure to his associates.”).
155. Lipinski, 227 Minn. at 519, 35 N.W.2d at 712 (stating it is immaterial
whether the relationship formed was a general partnership or a joint enterprise
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strip of land, owned by a third party, which they used for hauling
156
the fish. Martin, one of the partners, had previously encouraged
other partners to buy this strip of land to ensure their continued
157
Some time later,
use of it, but they ignored his suggestions.
Martin heard some partners talk about ousting some partners so
158
the remaining partners could have more profit. Worried that he
might be ousted, Martin secretly purchased the strip of land to
159
Martin then requested
leverage his position in the partnership.
160
The other
rent payments for the partnership’s use of the land.
partners sued, asserting that Martin never disclosed his intent to
161
purchase the land nor did he seek their consent.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Martin did not
violate a fiduciary duty when he bought the strip of land used by
the partnership because Martin had told them about the land prior
162
to his interest in buying it, and the purchase was outside the
163
scope of the business.
The court noted that the scope of the
business was a “fishing enterprise and not an undertaking to
acquire land, or to improve or develop real estate, or to sell or lease
164
land to others.” The court observed that “[i]n determining their
respective obligations, a court should always keep in mind the
purposes for which the participants were associated and the
165
manner in which the association was organized.”
The court
found nothing in the agreement suggesting that the enterprise had
166
the object or purpose to acquire real estate.
Further, the court held that Martin did not buy the land “as
the result of any information, priority, or advantageous position
167
Because
which he had obtained by virtue of the [partnership].”
Martin had disclosed the possibility of buying the land and the
partners had no interest in buying it, Martin had no duty to
because both relationships are substantially that of copartnership).
156. Id. at 513, 35 N.W.2d at 709–10.
157. Id. at 514, 35 N.W.2d at 710.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 521, 35 N.W.2d at 714.
161. Id. at 514–15, 35 N.W.2d at 710.
162. Id. at 521, 35 N.W.2d at 713–14.
163. Id. at 520, 35 N.W.2d at 713.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 522, 35 N.W.2d at 714.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 516, 35 N.W.2d at 711.
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168

disclose his plan to buy it.
Thus, this case stands for the notion
that the scope of a partnership may be so limited that the
acquisition of an asset leased by the partnership is not usurpation
of a partnership opportunity, nor does it violate a duty to disclose.
2.

Appletree Square I Ltd. Partnership v. Investmark, Inc.

In a 1993 case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals would not give
effect to a partnership agreement that replaced a partner’s duty to
disclose all material information affecting the partnership with a
duty to disclose such information only after another partner made
169
a request.
In this case, sophisticated parties formed their partnership
170
under the 1976 RULPA as enacted in the Minnesota Statutes.
The partners’ agreement limited the partners’ duty of disclosure by
stating that the general partners would “provide the partners with
171
all information that may reasonably be requested.”
The general partners sold their fifteen-story office building to
172
Years after the sale, the limited partners
the limited partners.
learned that the building was contaminated with asbestos, which
173
prompted this suit.

168. The court did not specifically discuss the duty to disclose, but the
conclusion that Martin did not violate the duty to disclose is implied. See id. at
521, 35 N.W.2d at 713. The plaintiffs’ claim was based on whether Martin
“purchased this land . . . without their knowledge.” Id. at 514–15, 35 N.W.2d at
710. The court mentions that Martin had encouraged them to buy the land. Id. at
514, 35 N.W.2d at 710. The court proceeds to hold that Martin violated no
fiduciary duty. Id. at 522, 35 N.W.2d at 714.
In addition, the duty to disclose relates only to information material to
the partnership. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 20 (1914) (“Partners shall render on
demand true and full information of all things affecting the partnership to any
partner.”). Here, the purchase of the land was immaterial to the partnership
because it was found to be outside the scope of the business. Lipinski, 227 Minn. at
520, 35 N.W.2d at 713. Second, the ownership of the land appeared immaterial to
the court, provided that Martin “practice[d] no fraud or deception upon his
copartners and [held] his fee subject to the lease for the duration thereof.” See id.
Thus, although the court did not specifically discuss the duty to disclose, the
conclusion that Martin did not violate the duty to disclose is implied. See id. at
521, 35 N.W.2d at 713.
169. See Appletree Square I Ltd. P'ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889,
893, 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
170. Id. at 891 (referencing Minn. Stat. §§ 322A.01–.87 (1980)).
171. Id. at 893.
172. Id. at 891.
173. Id.
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In considering the partners’ agreement to waive the duty to
disclose without demand, the court acknowledged that under
Minnesota’s 1976 RULPA statute, “[p]artners may change their
common law and statutory duties by incorporating such changes in
174
their partnership agreement.”
But the court then held that the
general partners could not “replace their broad duty of disclosure
with a narrow duty to render information upon demand” because
that “would destroy the fiduciary character of their relationship,
175
and it would also invite fraud.”
The court reasoned that, “[u]nless partners knew what
questions to ask, they would have no right to know material
176
Further, it said, “where the
information about the business.”
major purpose of a contract clause is to shield wrongdoers from
177
liability, the clause will be set aside as against public policy.”
Thus, the court concluded that the provision limiting the duty to
178
disclose would be given no effect.
C. Circuit Courts of Appeal Cases
1.

Wartski v. Bedford

In a 1991 decision very similar to the Triple Five decisions, the
First Circuit refused to allow one partner to buy an interest in the
partnership from other partners without disclosing the opportunity
to the remaining partner, despite a provision in a partnership
179
agreement expressly allowing the partners to compete.
In this case, an inventor and a businessman formed a limited
partnership in 1981 under Massachusetts law to develop a device
180
Both men were general partners with other
for motor vehicles.
181
The partnership agreement provided that the
limited partners.
“[g]eneral [p]artners shall not be prevented from engaging in
other activities for profit, whether in research and development or

174. Id. at 893.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 893–94.
179. Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 1991).
180. Id. at 14–15. Inventor Heinz Wartski was the plaintiff, and businessman
Terence Bedford was the defendant. See id. at 14.
181. Id. at 15.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

29

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2007], Art. 8
7. HALL - RC.DOC

1512

4/22/2007 5:43:51 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:4

otherwise, and whether or not competitive with the business of the
182
When the business appeared to fail, the
partnership.”
businessman bought the limited partners’ interest in the
183
partnership to obtain control of the business and the invention.
The court found the businessman failed to disclose to the inventor
his purchase of the limited partners’ interest in the partnership,
184
which prevented the partner from participating in the purchase.
The court considered a provision in the partnership
agreement stating “[g]eneral [p]artners shall not be prevented
from engaging in other activities for profit, whether in research
and development or otherwise, and whether or not competitive
185
with the business of the partnership.”
First, the court doubted
that the partners actually intended this language to include the
“technology which was the heart and soul of the partnership
186
venture and the brainchild of the other partner.”
Second, the
court declared that even if the provision included the heart and
soul of the partnership, a partnership agreement “cannot nullify
the fiduciary duty owed by [the businessman] to the
187
partnership.”
The court explained that “[t]he fiduciary duty of
partners is an integral part of the partnership agreement whether
or not expressly set forth therein . . . [which] cannot be negated by
188
the words of the partnership agreement.” Thus, this case stands
for the notion that a partnership agreement allowing partners to
compete will be given no effect if a partner fails to disclose an
opportunity that relates to the heart of the partnership’s business.

182. Id. at 20.
183. Id. at 16–17. The court observed that the businessman sought “to obtain
for himself the exclusive right, title and interest to the patent rights to an
invention and its technology, which was the heart and soul of the partnership
venture and the brainchild of the other partner.” Id. at 20.
184. Id. at 19. The businessman “admitted under examination by Wartski's
attorney at trial that his disclosures to Wartski were not complete.” Id.
185. Id. at 20.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)).
The court added, “or to put it another way: ‘Exculpatory provisions of corporate
articles create no license to steal. They do no more than to validate otherwise
invalid agreements if such agreements are shown to be fair.’” Id. (citing Irwin v. West
End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972)).
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Exxon Corp. v. Burglin

The Fifth Circuit decision in Exxon is contrary to both the
Wartski and Triple Five decisions. Applying Alaska law, the Fifth
Circuit held that a general partner was not liable for violating the
duty to disclose information it kept secret from limited partners
189
because the duty to disclose was limited in their agreement.
In Exxon, sophisticated parties formed their limited
190
Essentially, the
partnership expressly subject to Alaska law.
partnership agreement provided that “[t]he general partner must
furnish the limited partners with information necessary to evaluate
their interests, unless the general partner believed the information
191
was confidential.”
The court noted that the partnership
agreement was between parties competing in the oil industry who
were highly sophisticated parties, bargaining at arms length, with
assistance of legal counsel, who paid substantial sums of money for
192
giving up the right to disclosure.
The lawsuit arose because the general partner learned about
the value of an oil field owned by the partnership but did not
disclose this to the limited partners when the limited partners
offered to sell their interests in the partnership to the general
193
partner.
The parties made the sale based on an agreement
expressly stating that the limited partners were selling without
194
The sale
knowing the future profit potential of the oil fields.
agreement also gave the limited partners an option to have an

189. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1300–02 (5th Cir. 1993).
190. Id. at 1298.
191. Id. at 1300. The partner’s agreement provided “no Limited Partner shall
have the right to any confidential information concerning the status of the
Leases." Id. at 1299. The agreement further provided that:
The General Partner shall not be obligated to furnish any information
concerning subsurface structure, reserves or other information
concerning the Leases which the General Partner believes would be in
the best interest of the Partnership or of the General Partner to be kept
confidential. However, . . . the General Partner will furnish to the
Limited Partners all nonconfidential information relevant to the
evaluation to the Partnership Interest of each Limited Partner, such as
reserves, projected rate of production, etc.
Id. at 1299–1300.
192. Id. at 1299.
193. Id. at 1297.
194. Id. The contract provided that the parties’ agreement was “based on data
available today without knowing the results” of oil field tests. Id.
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independent consultant examine the fairness of the offer, which
195
they failed to do.
The court found that the partnership agreement recognized
that the partnership had “an inherent need for secrecy to protect
itself from outside competition” and the general partner had an
“individual need to protect its interests from the limited
196
partners.”
Accordingly, the court gave effect to the parties’
agreement, including the fiduciary duty limitations, and held that
the general partner “was under no duty to disclose” the
197
Thus, this case stands
information that it deemed confidential.
for the notion that sophisticated parties may waive their duty to
disclose and may directly compete with their partners.
D. Other Cases
1.

Singer v. Singer

In a 1981 case, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that
a partner in an oil production partnership did not violate a
fiduciary duty when it purchased land within the area of the
partnership’s interest because of a provision in the partners’
198
agreement:
Each partner shall be free to enter into business and other
transactions for his or her own separate individual
account, even though such business or other transaction
may be in conflict with and/or competition with the
business of this partnership. Neither the partnership nor
any individual member of this partnership shall be
entitled to claim or receive any part of or interest in such
transactions, it being the intention and agreement that
any partner will be free to deal on his or her own account
to the same extent and with the same force and effect as if
he or she were not and never had been members of this
199
partnership.

195. Id. The contract granted the limited partners the option to “select a
mutually acceptable consultant to make an independent assessment of Exxon's
offer,” for which the general partner would pay half the cost. Id.
196. Id. at 1299.
197. Id. at 1300.
198. Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766, 772–73 (Okla. Civ. App. 1981).
199. Id. at 768.
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The court explained that the partners had a contractual right
to compete with partners “as if there never had been a
200
Accordingly, it held that the partners contracted
partnership.”
away the “right to expect a noncompetitive fiduciary relationship
201
with any of its partners.”
2.

Sonet v. Timber Co.

In 1998, a Delaware court held that general partners seeking
to convert their limited partnership to a real estate investment
trust, which benefited them but harmed a limited partner, did not
202
owe common-law fiduciary duties to the limited partner. Because
the parties had the right to alter their fiduciary duties, the
partnership agreement’s limitations on fiduciary duties would be
given full effect as long as the provisions were clear and
203
unambiguous.
The court explained that “principles of contract
preempt fiduciary principles where the parties to a limited
204
While
partnership have made their intentions to do so plain.”
this case aligns with others discussed here supporting the notion
that partners may limit their fiduciary duties, it goes further by
explicitly stating that contractual principles may override fiduciary
205
duties in an unincorporated business entity. This “contractarian”
206
view is consistent with a myriad of Delaware cases.

E. Harmonizing These Cases by Distinguishing Battles over Ownership
One attempt to harmonize these seemingly disparate decisions
could be made by distinguishing a partner’s disclosure and
competition with the partnership generally, from a partner’s
disclosure and competition with another partner regarding the

200. Id. at 772.
201. Id.
202. Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 322–27 (Del. Ch. 1998).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 322.
205. Tammy Savidge Moore, The Policy of Opting-Out of Fiduciary Duties in a
Limited Liability Company: McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enterprises, 725 N.E.2d 1193
(Ohio Ct. App. 1999), 42 S. TEX L. REV. 183, 196 (2000).
206. See Sonet, 722 A.2d 319 at 322 (recognizing that “it [is] a correct statement
of law that principles of contract preempt fiduciary principles where the parties to
a limited partnership have made their intentions to do so plain” and that
“Delaware cases routinely uphold this view of limited partnership law”).
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207

purchase of a partner’s interest. Under the first, a partner desires
to compete in the same market as the partnership, such as by
opening a restaurant in the same neighborhood as the
partnership’s restaurant. It is easy to think of valid reasons for this,
such as when the partners already own competing restaurants in
the neighborhood and want to start another one together.
But when partners compete over the purchase of a third
partner’s interest, the battle is only between partners. It is difficult
to think of any good that could come from allowing partners to
keep secrets and compete for ownership of the partnership. Based
on this distinction, a partnership agreement should be allowed to
override a duty not to compete with the partnership generally, but
partners should not be allowed to modify their fiduciary duties
when it comes to ownership interests in the partnership.
Thus, this attempt to harmonize these seemingly disparate
decisions is appealing, but unfortunately is unworkable with the
208
cases here. First, Wartski v. Bedford held that partners may not buy
an interest in the partnership from other partners without
disclosing the opportunity to the remaining partner despite a
provision in a partnership agreement expressly allowing the
209
210
partners to compete.
The Triple Five holding was similar.
But
Exxon Corp. v. Burglin in the Fifth Circuit and Sonet v. Timber Co. in
Delaware both held that partners could waive their fiduciary duties
211
As a result, any
in relation to acquiring ownership interests.
attempt to harmonize these cases under this distinction appears
unworkable.
F.

Relevancy of These Cases

These cases present a wide range of outcomes. Some favor
allowing parties to limit their fiduciary duties, while others favor
applying fiduciary duties despite partnership agreements to the
contrary.

207. See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Ghent, Partner’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty to Copartner on
Sale of Partnership Interest to Another Partner, 4 A.L.R. 4th 1122 (1981) (presenting a
variety of cases on the general topic of a partner's duty to other partners in the
sale of another partner’s ownership interest in the partnership).
208. 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991).
209. Id. at 20.
210. 404 F.3d 1088, 1096–97 (8th Cir. 2005).
211. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1300–02 (5th Cir. 1993); Sonet v.
Timber Corp., 722 A.2d 319, 322–27 (Del. Ch. 1998).
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These conflicting views create uncertainty in the law. As a
result, partners may be discouraged from drafting partnership
agreements that provide substantial limitations on fiduciary duties.
Thus, some partners are stuck with an agreement that is less than
they would like. This burden may decrease their profits and
increase their transaction costs.
For example, profits are decreased if sophisticated companies
who compete with each other cannot establish a partnership at all,
because the law prevents them from eliminating their duty to
212
disclose.
Additionally, transaction costs are increased by hiring
lawyers and accountants to form and operate new business entities,
such as a Delaware LLC, that has greater ability to limit fiduciary
duties. Of course, those who seek to impose fiduciary duties
despite contrary partnership agreements would argue that these
costs are worthwhile to protect parties from abuse.
V. RIBSTEIN’S CRITICISMS OF THE TRIPLE FIVE V. SIMON DECISION
Larry E. Ribstein, an authority on fiduciary duties and an
advocate of “contractarian” rights, has criticized the Triple Five
213
Ribstein wrote that it was curious that the court
decisions.
214
distinguished contractual liability from fiduciary liability.
In his
comment, Ribstein highlights the district court’s bifurcated
215
The first issue would be
consideration of these two issues.
whether the exculpatory clause would limit liability from a breach
216
The second issue would
of duties that arose from the contract.
be whether the exculpatory clause could override the fiduciary
217
duties imposed by statute and the common law. In a state where
the power to contract overrides the imposition of fiduciary duties
212. While it is true that RUPA allows partners to place at least some limits on
the duty to disclose, the cases here demonstrate that courts may not be so
generous. Thus, despite RUPA, sophisticated parties that need to significantly
limit the duty to disclose, such as Exxon did, may find that a partnership is not
feasible because it would not be profitable. See Exxon, 4 F.3d 1294.
213. Posting of Larry Ribstein to IDEOBLOG, http://busmovie.typepad.com/
ideoblog/2005/04/the_joys_of_par.html.
214. Id.
215. See id. The court treated these issues separately because it granted a
motion to bifurcate the contractual and equitable issues. See Triple Five, 404 F.3d at
1094 (“The district court bifurcated the legal and equitable claims, and tried the
equitable issues in a bench trial.”).
216. See Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1094.
217. See id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

35

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2007], Art. 8
7. HALL - RC.DOC

1518

4/22/2007 5:43:51 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:4

by statute or common law, there is no need to separate these issues
because the exculpatory clause has the power to limit duties
218
otherwise imposed by statute, common law, or the contract.
Ribstein’s second criticism questions why the court in Triple
219
Five failed to address another provision in the parties’ agreement.
Ribstein writes,
[T]he court did not discuss another provision of the
agreement, Article XI (G):
Each Partner . . . may engage in, acquire and possess,
without liability or account ability to the other Partner,
. . . investments and interests of every nature and
description, independently or with others, including but
not limited to, any interests or investments similar to or in
competition with the Partnership’s business except those
which are involved in the development or operation of
the Project or Property. No Partner shall be liable to
another Partner for failing to offer to the Partnership or
the other Partner, or for appropriating or profiting from,
any business opportunity, except for those which involve
utilization of the Real Estate or which are necessary to the
220
Project.
This provision appears to relate to an interest, such as the interest
221
in the Mall of America that Teachers sold to SPG. But the court
may not have addressed this provision because it decided that the
language excluded Teachers’ interest.
That is, the first part of the provision expressly excluded
“interests or investments . . . which are involved in the development
222
Here, the Teachers’
or operation of the Project or Property.”
interest in the Mall of America plainly involved “operation of the
223
Project or Property.”
Similarly, the second part of the provision expressly excludes
business opportunities, “which involve utilization of the Real Estate
224
or which are necessary to the Project.” Thus, neither part of this
provision gave the partners the right to compete for the Teachers’
218. This, of course, assumes that the partnership agreement met the
requirement of being clear and unambiguous regarding the parties’ intent to limit
fiduciary duties. See Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 322–26 (Del. Ch. 1998).
219. IDEOBLOG, supra note 213.
220. See Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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225

interest For these reasons, the fact that the court did not address
this provision appears to have little consequence on fiduciary duty
law.
But Ribstein’s criticisms in this area are not limited to the
Triple Five decisions. In Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, the
authors criticize RUPA as “perverse” for the way it limits fiduciary
226
227
Even more substantial is Ribstein’s challenge to
duty waivers.
the traditional imposition of fiduciary duties on partnerships,
228
Ribstein has instead pushed
regardless of the partners’ desire.
for allowing sophisticated parties to, first, agree they may compete
for opportunities otherwise belonging to the partnership and,
229
second, limit their duty to disclose.
At least one circuit court
230
agrees.
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRIPLE FIVE V. SIMON FOR PARTNERSHIP
LAW IN MINNESOTA
The saga of the Triple Five decisions has great significance for
partnership law in Minnesota. The case greatly expanded the
231
Moreover, it bolstered courts’
application of fiduciary duties.
225. See id.
226. The duty to disclose is not a fiduciary duty under RUPA. See REVISED
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 (1997) (amended 2005) (“The only fiduciary duties a
partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and
the duty of care . . . .”).
227. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(h), at 6:164 (Supp. 2005)
(explaining that RUPA’s restrictions on fiduciary duty limitations are perverse for
many reasons, such as how on one hand, RUPA will give no effect to limitations
that that are not “specific” even if a court deems them “reasonable,” but on the
other hand, RUPA will give effect to “unreasonable” limitations that are not
“manifestly unreasonable”).
228. Larry E. Ribstein, Symposium on the Future of the Unincorporated Firm:
Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 538–94
(1997) (discussing cases and policies involving fiduciary duties and limitations on
them).
229. See id.
230. See Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1298 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting 2
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(h), at 6:89 (Supp. 1991)).
231. Fiduciary duties were expanded because they were no longer restrained
by fiduciary duty limitation provisions in partnership agreements such as the one
in Triple Five v. Simon. See Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 280 F. Supp. 2d 895,
901 (D. Minn. 2003); see also supra Part III.A.2 (quoting the language of the
fiduciary duty limitation in the parties’ partnership agreement). Triple Five also
stands for the notion that the fiduciary duties of a publicly traded company can
extend to the partner of one of its minority owners because of the control the
partner has in the corporation. Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 404 F.3d 1088,
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equitable authority to rewrite partnership agreements, including
those that affect the rights of third parties not involved in the
232
case.
A. Fiduciary Duty
The enforcement of fiduciary duties has long protected
partners. The expansion of fiduciary duties, however, may have
consequences.
Triple Five stands for the proposition that fiduciary duty
limitations of the type involved in Triple Five are void. Thus,
partners of partnerships with such fiduciary duty limitations, at
least in Minnesota, now have greater duties than if those limitations
had effect. That is, these partners are now subject to fiduciary
duties unrestrained by their fiduciary duty limitations. As a result,
individuals or businesses with fiduciary duties to more than one
business may find themselves with conflicting fiduciary duties, just
as the Simons did. These conflicting duties may even be imposed
233
on publicly held corporations.
The Simons’ partnership and their involvement in SPG caused
234
the Simons to owe fiduciary duties to both Triple Five and SPG.
Further, the court held that a publicly traded company can owe
fiduciary duties to the partner of one of its minority owners
235
because of the control the partner has in the corporation.
This
1096 (8th Cir. 2005).
232. This reference is to Teachers, which was not a party in the case but found
itself with a new managing partner, Triple Five, instead of its original managing
partner, the Simons. See Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 909. This was a result of the
court using its equitable power to change the managing partner, which in effect
rewrote the partnership agreement regarding this aspect. See Exxon, 4 F.3d at
1297.
233. The Eighth Circuit recognized this problem when noting that it was “not
unmindful of the difficulties faced by business people who are principals in related
corporate entities.” Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1096 (citing Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897,
901 (2d Cir. 1967)); see also Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 906 (providing this quote
in its larger context). But for the Eighth Circuit, this concern was outweighed by
concerns that the connections between the publicly owned SPG corporation and
the Simons were “far too close for comfort” and “this case present[ed] the worst
kind of self-dealing and subterfuge.” Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1096 (demonstrating
that the closeness was a significant factor in the Eighth Circuit’s explanation for
holding that SPG owed Triple Five fiduciary duties); see also Triple Five, 280 F.
Supp. 2d at 898–901 (explaining the Simons’ extensive involvement in SPG).
234. Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1096.
235. Id. (holding that the SPG corporation owed fiduciary duties to Triple Five
because of the control the Simons had in SPG).
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type of conflict had great consequences, as the SPG shareholders
and the Simons realized.
236
in multiple enterprises may find
Similarly, partners
themselves owing fiduciary duties to multiple entities that
eventually have competing interests. While business people may try
to plan for the possibility of conflicting fiduciary duties by general
contractual limitations on fiduciary duties, courts often disregard
such clauses—even when written by sophisticated parties, as in the
237
agreement between Triple Five and the Simons.
The result is
that people are prevented from participating in ventures that could
eventually compete, limiting potential investment and business
development.
But some may argue that these economic consequences could
be outweighed by the economic benefits that proceed from
people’s confidence in the protections offered by a broad
application of fiduciary duties. It is also possible that the final
holding in Triple Five could be limited to cases in which the court
238
finds that a partner has engaged in “nefarious conduct.”
B. Statutory Law
The effect that Triple Five will have on the application of
statutory partnership law in Minnesota is uncertain. Triple Five
and the Simons joined together in a limited partnership,
239
But the
presumably subject to RULPA and its UPA backdrop.
court relied more on the common law than statute. Moreover,
when the court applied statutes, it applied both the UPA and
240
241
RUPA, citing the UPA for “the duty to account,” RUPA for the
236. This includes corporations that are partners in a partnership. See id.
237. In Triple Five, the parties were “sophisticated business partners,” Triple
Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 907, who drafted their partnership agreement with a
general contractual limitation on fiduciary duties. See id. at 901; see also supra text
accompanying note 6 (quoting the language of the partnership agreement).
238. Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, No. 99-1894 (PAM/RLE), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 39841, at *31 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2005) (referring to the Simons’
“nefarious conduct”); Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1096 (calling the Simons’ conduct
“the worst kind of self-dealing and subterfuge”). But as bad as these acts were, it is
worth noting the acts did not rise to the level of fraud. See id. at 1096 (noting that
“the district court specifically found that there was no fraud, gross negligence, or
misappropriation of funds”).
239. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 1105 (1976) (“In any case not
provided for in this [Act] the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act govern.”).
240. Critics may question whether the court’s reliance on both UPA and RUPA
was haphazard or whether it was in reference to events occurring at various times,
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proposition that “a partnership is liable for the wrongful acts or
242
omissions of a partner,” and the UPA for a partner’s “duty to
render to any partner on demand true and full information as to
243
all things affecting the partnership.” The Eighth Circuit holding
in Triple Five suggests that Minnesota partnerships cannot rely
merely on statutory language specific to their entity; they must also
consider the weight and attention the court gives to the common
244
law.
C. Remedies
The courts in the Triple Five decisions assumed the power to
rewrite a partnership agreement and replace the managing partner
245
with a limited partner. ULPA-2001 and UPA provide no authority
for the court to amend a partnership agreement and remove a
general partner from the management role unless based on an
agreement of the partners. Even Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v.
246
Salmon refused to upset Salmon’s management and control of the
247
business. The district court cited no authority for such a remedy,
248
but instead presumably relied upon the court’s equitable powers.
This power to rewrite partnership agreements has enormous and

which were subject to the different statutes because of the statutes’ enactment
dates. The case does not provide an answer to this question.
241. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 900 (citing Minnesota’s version of UPA,
MINN. STAT. § 323.20, renumbered as MINN. STAT. § 323A.0404 (2006)).
242. Id. (citing Minnesota’s version of RUPA, MINN. STAT. § 323A.3-05,
renumbered as MINN. STAT. § 323A.0305 (2006)).
243. Id. (citing Minnesota’s version of UPA, MINN. STAT. § 323.19, renumbered
as MINN. STAT. § 323A.0403 (2006)).
244. One view is that courts should not disregard applicable statutes. A
contrary view is that courts of equity cannot be limited by the statutory law,
especially when newly revised statutes do not conform with the time-tested
common-law doctrines. Either way, practitioners should realize that a court’s
equitable concerns may trump partnership statutes.
245. Id. at 909; see also Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1100, (holding that the court saw
“no abuse of discretion in [the district court’s] decision to remove [the Simons] as
managing partner”).
246. 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
247. Id. at 548–49 (holding that Salmon should receive half of the ownership
shares “together with one additional share” to maintain his role as managing
partner despite failing to disclose to his partner, Meinhard, a partnership
opportunity and then usurping that partnership opportunity).
248. See Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1094, 1100 (“The district court bifurcated the
legal and equitable claims, and tried the equitable issues in . . . this equitable
action.”).
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far-reaching effects on partnership law, partners’ profits and
finances, control of partnerships, and the rights of third parties
transacting with partnerships or working in collaboration with
249
partnerships because it disregards the clear intent of the partners
250
and upsets others’ reliance on their arrangement.
Maybe this
extreme equitable remedy, however, is only reserved for partners
251
with the most “nefarious conduct.”
D. Rights of Third Parties
The Triple Five case is significant for third parties like Teachers
and SPG’s shareholders. Teachers became bound under a new
252
managing partner in violation of its partnership agreement.
249. This refers to other partners, such as Teachers. See infra Part VI.D.
250. For example, this could include businesses who have established a
relationship with the general partner to provide services to the partnership. The
switch to a new general partner could result in the loss of business or the failure to
renew a contract because the new general partner has other service providers it
would prefer to use.
251. See cases cited supra note 238 (discussing the Simons’ “nefarious
conduct”).
252. The fact that Teachers became bound to a new managing partner raises
concerns for Teachers’ right to have the managing partner to which it originally
agreed. See Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 909 (ordering modification of the
partnership agreement to make Triple Five the managing partner). Teachers’
expectation interest in having the Simons as the managing partner was upset when
the court modified the partnership agreement. But the Eighth Circuit explained
that “[Teachers’] hands were not exactly unsullied” because Teachers failed to
disclose to Triple Five its negotiations with the Simons and SPG. Triple Five, 404
F.3d at 1100. However, Teachers was not a party to this litigation, so it was not
present to explain or defend itself. See Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, No. 991984 (PAM), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11673, at *5 (D. Minn. June 24, 2004) (“The
parties chose not to include Teachers in this litigation.”).
Initially, the effect of upsetting Teachers’ expectation interest resulted in
little change for Teachers for two reasons. First, the parties agreed that a Simon
business would continue as property manager of the Mall of America. Id. Second,
the district court noted that although Triple Five became the managing partner,
the court did not order a change in the Mall of America’s property management
company:
It was not the Court's intent in the Order to require any changes in the
day-to-day management of the Mall. Thus, it is the Court's expectation
that the current managers of the Mall will remain in place. Those
managers may continue to make ordinary business decisions on behalf of
the Mall. The injunction requires that the managers receive written
permission from Triple Five only for decisions outside the ordinary
course of business.
Id. at *10. Still, Triple Five had the right as managing partners to replace the
property management company, but this right was stayed during appeal to the
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Likewise, the majority of SPG shareholders suffered harm because
a few key members of SPG had fiduciary duties to another
253
Under the final Triple Five decision, similarly situated
business.
shareholders and limited partners will be required to protect
themselves. But another view is that the court has protected them
by removing managing partner with a history of “nefarious
254
conduct.” Either way, this case has had a profound effect beyond
the rights of partners and potentially third parties.
E. Advice for Partners
How can partners protect themselves? Partners who want full
fiduciary duties to apply to their partnership should have no
concern under the Triple Five decisions because fiduciary duties will
apply by default. But partners seeking to limit fiduciary duties are
in a more precarious position because of the uncertainty in
ascertaining whether a court would enforce the language they
place in their partnership agreement to limit their fiduciary duties.
Eighth Circuit. Id. at *23–25. Further, the district court noted that the property
manager was owned by the Simons and the property management fees were
excessive. See id. For these reasons, Triple Five would very likely replace the
property manager. This change, along with all other changes that Triple Five
could make as managing partner, suggests the significance for Teachers to have a
new managing partner. Accordingly, Teachers’ expectation interest was upset by
the court, but this still may have been best for two reasons.
First, as previously noted, Teachers had unclean hands, so it was not in a
strong position to insist on its right to its expectation interests. Second, the
dysfunctional relationship between the parties suggests that a trust or dissolution
were the only other alternatives to making Triple Five the managing partner.
Indeed, the court considered dissolving the partnership: “Given the untenable
relationship between the parties, the Court strongly urges the parties to dissolve
the dysfunctional partnership. However, a court-ordered dissolution is premature
and inappropriate.” Id. at *22.
Many SPG shareholders probably had no knowledge of the Simons’ acts.
Moreover, some may have had no knowledge of the conflicts of interest that
existed for the Simons. That is, the Simons had fiduciary duties to SPG for their
positions at SPG, and the Simons also had fiduciary duties to their privately held
entities that owned interest in the Mall of America. But to be fair, there are
reasons SPG shareholders should be exposed to this liability.
First, whether SPG shareholders had knowledge of the Simons’ acts or
not, the shareholders would still benefit from them if the court had not
intervened. Second, by the very nature of investing, shareholders accept liability
for wrongful acts of the corporation or its agents up to the amount of their
investment. Said differently, the shareholders had accepted liability for the acts of
the corporation’s agents.
254. See cases cited supra note 238 (discussing the Simons’ “nefarious
conduct”).
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The uniform partnership laws provide some advice for ways to
255
limit fiduciary duties, and the Exxon decision provides more
aggressive methods, albeit more risky.
For example, under RUPA section 103(b), “the partnership
agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities that
256
do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable.”
Likewise, Exxon suggests that partners may increase the likelihood
that their fiduciary duty limitations will be enforceable if their
partnership agreement is between parties already in competition,
who are highly sophisticated parties, bargaining at arms length,
with assistance of legal counsel, and if the partner giving up the
257
right to disclosure is financially compensated for this.
But whether partners follow the advice of the statutes, or opt
for the more aggressive approach under Exxon, courts may still
apply the common law, especially when a court perceives that
equity requires it. This is demonstrated by Triple Five and other
cases discussed here, which had a variety of outcomes despite the
uniformity of statutory law. Accordingly, courts appear more likely
to give effect to fiduciary duty limitations that comply with the
applicable partnership statute when the partners do not use the
limitations in a way that appears wrongful or deceptive.
The Triple Five decisions have implications for all Minnesota
partnerships and people involved with them. It remains unclear
whether these decisions were an earthquake for partnership law in
Minnesota or merely extreme measures required for exceptionally
nefarious conduct in a partnership.
As a result, drafting
partnership agreements limiting the duty to disclose and the duty
not to usurp partnership opportunities has become more
precarious since the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Triple Five.

255.
256.
257.

4 F.3d 1294 (5th Cir. 1993).
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b) (1997) (amended 2005).
Exxon, 4 F.3d at 1298–99.
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